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Ethics and Sovereignty 
William L. Blizek and Rory J. Conces 
Department of Philosophy and Religion, Univers ity of Nebraska at Omaha, Omaha, NE 68182-0265 
In the political arena, every nation is considered to be 
sovereign. That is. what happens within the legitimate bor-
ders of a nation, what docs not affect other nations, is 10 be 
decided by the people of that nation or the government of' 
thnt nation and no one else. If a nation wants to centralize 
economic decisions, that is its business. If a nation wants a 
free market economy, no other nation can interfere. If a na-
tion wants to be represented by a new form of government, 
it has the right to change governments. And so on. 
Outside or the political arena, however, in the arena of 
ethics. can we say that the ethics of each nation is sovereign 
in the sarnc way that its poli tical arrangements arc sover-
eign? Are the moral rules o f each nation to be decided by 
the people of that nation and no one else? Is it wrong for 
any other nation to intervene in the ethical li fe ofa nation 
that has selected its own set of ethical rules? Or, docs ethics 
go beyond political boundaries·? If it is right for some, is it 
not right for everyone? Aren't there some kinds of behavior 
thm we can condc1nn Crom an ethical point of view. even if 
they have been selected by the people of some other na-
tion? 
A ll of these questions arc being raised as the morality 
or nations becomes widely known and the ethical behavior 
of a nation can be known around the world instantaneously. 
The more we know about the ethics of nations, the more 
frequently such questions arc likely to arise, leaving us with 
the question or how we arc to understand ethics and the 
sovereignty of nations. In the following. we try to make a 
contribution to that understanding. 
I 
There are two familiar ways to see the relationship be-
tween ethics and sovereignty. TI1e lirst is to say that ethics, 
like politics. is a mailer for each nation to decide for itself 
and it is not the business of any other nation 10 interfere 
with that decision. The second is 10 say that ethics reaches 
beyond sovereignty, that some things are right or wrong, 
independently of what the people of any nation elai m. We 
wi ll consider each of these views in turn. 
If we accept the view that the ethics of any nation is 
sovereign, in the way that i1s politics and laws are sovcr• 
eign, we encounter all of the problems associated with what 
is frequently called "cultural relativism." The basic prob-
lem of cultural relativism is that it prevents us from saying 
or any other culture that what they do is wrong. as long as 
what they do conforms to the ethical standards adopted by 
that culture. If, for example, the people of one culture (or 
nation) decide to practice apartheid, then no other culture 
can say that what they are doing is wrong, as long as what 
they are doing is confonning to the standard of apartheid. 
Outsiders could say that what the people of another 
culture arc doing is wrong, but they could only say this of 
actions that violated the ethical standard or that society. For 
example, we could say or any culture that had adopted apart-
heid that its people were ucting wrongly or th.ti one or ils 
policies was wrong, if we arc rcforring to aclions or policies 
1hat arc contrary to apartheid. Outsiders could also say th:u 
what the people or a culture are doing is wrong, but they 
could only mean by this that what those people arc doing is 
not what we consider to be right, and nothing more. What 
we cannot say if cultural relmivism is corrcc1 (or if 1hc cth• 
ics of natio11s arc sovereign) is that whm people do in other 
cultures that conforrns to their own moral standards is "re· 
ally" wrong. 
But, it is j ust this problem that causes us 10 abandon the 
perspective of cultural relativism. We do believe that some 
actions arc wrong. even i r they have been adopted by the 
people or another culture (or even some people in our own 
culture). We believe, for example, th::u apartheid is wrong, 
really wrong, even if some culture adopts apartheid as a 
1>0liey ror treating some of its people differently from oth-
ers. We hclicvc that ethnic clcnnsing is wrong. even if it is :1 
practice adopted by other cultures. We believe that execut-
ing suspected dissidents without a trial, a fair trial (i.e., with-
out reall y knowing whether the suspects have behaved n, 
they have been charged) is wrong, even if this is a common 
practice in other cultures. 
And we do not just think that such behaviors arc mor-
ally wrong, for we expect others to agree that such behav-
iors are morally wrong-although we might not expect the 
agreement of those who participate in such behaviors. 111c 
wrongness of such behaviors does not I ie in the fact that the 
behaviors arc different from our own culture's behaviors, 
but that they arc uni versally wrong. 11,cy would he wrong 
in our own culture if we adopted those behaviors. We think 
such behaviors arc really wrong, and not just wrong as a 
matter of taste or culture. 
As long as we view some behaviors as wrong across 
cultures, then we must reject cultural relativism and with it 
1he view that the ethics of nations arc sovereign in the same 
way lhut the internal politics of m!lions arc sovereign. 
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II 
The second famili ar way of viewing ethics ;md sover-
eignty is 10 ~cc the cahics of our own culture as corrcc,. or 
more enloghtcned. or more civilitcd, than the ethics of other 
cultures (at least some other cultures) and. therefore. asap, 
plying to other cultures, whether or not they accept or":"-
ogni,.c th;ll application. Some cultures arc morally superior 
tn others, anti lhosc cultures or moral superiority hnvc the 
right. indeed the obligation, 10 instruct other cultures in their 
morality or even to bring about changes io the ethics of other 
culturcs-po,;sibly even by some form of coercion. 
But this view of ethics and sovereignty runs into its 
own set of problems. These problems we would identify as 
the problems of coloniali sm. Thnt is, one culture or notion 
treats the people of other cultures badly {from the moral 
point of view) by forcing them to conform 10 particular stan-
dards. all m the name of1rca11ng them well. i.e .. improving 
their morality. E,·en condemning another culture, because 
it docs not conform 10 all of our own standards. is a way of 
treating another culture in a morall y inapproprinte ,v_ay. 
Theoreticall y. we arc willing 10 say that the voew of 
ethics and ~ovcrcignty thnt includes cuhurnl rclnuvbrn is 
wrong. Tho~ means that there arc some things that arc rc~lly 
right or wrong. regardless of how another culture perceives 
them. 111c prohlcm with what we arc calling the colonial 
perspective is not a theoretical problem, but rather u practi-
cal problem. It is the problem of seeing what we dons right 
simply because we do it or we arc familiar with it. '!"is 
tendency 1s a common one and if we are to talk meaning-
fully about cthi~ across boundaries, we will have 10 make 
an cffon 10 curb this tendency. 
Since neither of the familiar views seems 10 us n salis-
foctory way 10 understand ethics and sovereignty. we make 
the following proposal. The ethics of nntions arc not sover-
eign-to avoid the problems of cultural rela1ivism-bu1 the 
ethics of any gl\·cn nalion are not necessarily ethics thal 
apply to everyone-the problem or believing that my val-
ues arc correct because lhcy nrc mine. What is required is a 
case hy case cx:1mination or lhc vnrious values or prncticcs 
of any nation 10 sec if they meet some sense of moralily to 
which people from different cultures can agree. Is the ex-
ample before us more like a c:isc where there is wide agree-
ment that such behavior is wrong? Or, is it closer 10 one in 
which one culture tries to imp<>se its views on another. 
1r this thcorctical undcrsrnnding, call it the case study 
method if you will. is to be ,aiisfactory, then it will have 10 
work in praclice. We would now like to apply this method 
10 scvcr:il examples. 
III 
Legal Punishment 
The first set of case studies concerns various forms of 
legal punishmenl. On the one hand, there seems to be a clear 
acknowlcdgmenl in the United State., and elsewhere lhat 
imprisonmcnl or incapacit:llion is a onor.illy acceptable fonn 
of punishment. particularly when certain conditions nrc be· 
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lieved 10 have been satisfied. Assuming thal the original 
conviction was a just one, lhese conditions may include a 
prohibition on 1he severity of 1hc imprisonment unduly ex· 
cccding the morn! grnvi1y of the offense {i.e .. an acknowl-
edgment of a rule of proportionality) and the requirement 
that the conditions of imprisonment should include adequate 
health care and protection from others who arc confined in 
the same facility {i.e .. an acknowledgment that 1ho,e in the 
custody of 1he state should be trcmed in a humane way). 
On the other hand, there seems 10 be wide agreement. 
albeit far less 1han the agreement on imprisonment. that the 
death penalty is morally wrong. Some may argue that the 
death penalty consiuutes a denial of the offender·s d1gnily 
as a human being, while others object 10 it on the grounds 
that it is an act or revenge. Still others may view the death 
penalty as immoral not because the act of puuing someone 
10 death is in principle mor:illy rcpugnanl. but because lhc 
punishment may not satisfy the "demands of justice" which 
requires punishing only the guilty. In the worst case sce-
nnrio. capital punishment may be used to intimidate or ter, 
rorizc some segment of a society. 111e trial and execution of 
the Nigerian playwright and human-rights activist Ken Saro-
Wiwa in 1995 b a case in point. Out lhe "demands or JUS· 
1ice" may also not be served by the legal system found m 
1he United States. How could this be? First, it is not true 
thnl every person who kills another human being is guihy 
of perpetrating ncrimc. It is quite common for people to die 
ns a result of nn accident or an act of justifiable or cxcus-
:oble homicide. But even if ii Is clear 1ha1 several persons 
have commiued crimes by killing another human being. it 
should not be taken for granted that they are guilty of com-
rniuing the same crime. Each person may be found guihy of 
having commilled one of scvcrnl crimes: fi rst-degree mur· 
der, sccond,degrcc murder, or manslaughler. In the case of 
a post-Flln11a11 c.,pital murder trial, if the jury decided agamst 
the defendant on the issue of guilt or innocence by handing 
down the verdict of guilty of capilal murder, then the jury 
would have 10 decide on the issue of death or life imprison· 
ment.1 In the penally s1agc of the trial procedure, the jury 
would be required 10 consider all aggravating and mitigal-
ing circums1ances in deciding whether the death penally is 
the proper punishmcnl for the convicted defendant. Possible 
aggravating circumslances include lhe capital felony being 
eommilled for pecuniary gain or that it was especially hci• 
nous, atrocious. or cruel; possible miligati ng circumst:mces 
include the defendant having no significant history of prior 
criminal activity or that the defendant was under duress al 
the time of 1hc crime.' 
Given the series of discretionary stages of the Ameri-
can criminal justice process, it is apparent thal judgcmenls 
concerning someone's guilt and dcscn can be affected by a 
number of irrclcvanl factors including ethnic and racial at-
titudes. Indeed. some s1a1istical studies have shown that 
blacks killing whites have the greatest chance of being given 
the death penally, while whites killing blacks have lhe least 
chnnce of being executed. This is suggested by the dispro-
portionaie pcrccntngc of blacks who nre under sentence of 
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death.' Apparently there is a sumcienl number of discre-
tionary decisionmakers who believe that the seriousness of 
one crime far outweighs that or another and so deserves a 
more severe punishmcnl. So even afler the pos1-Fumia11 
refonns were implemented, we have some reason not to be 
overly confident that the American criminal justice system 
can sort out those who deserve to be executed from those 
who do not in a way that is both rational and just. If our 
confidence has been compromised in any way, then per-
haps we ought 10 reject the death penally as a legal form of 
punishment in the United States. 
But what about caning as a legal rorm of punishment 
for an offence such as vandalism? Is caning a case where 
there is wide agreement that such punishment is morally 
wrong (similar to the case of capirnl punishment) or does 
the uproar against il make it closer lo one in which one cul-
ture Lrics to impose its views on another? Caning appears to 
be closer 10 the lauer. Take the recent case of Michael Fay. 
Michael Fay was an A111cric~111 tccnagcr Ii ving in Si ngaporc. 
In 1994 Fay was arrested and found guilty or several acts of 
vandalism, including a week long spree of spray-painting 
gram ii on cars. His punishment included a line, a jail sen-
tence, and being given four strokes with a ranen cain.' The 
sentence brought world-wide condemnation of Singapore's 
treatment of Fay. The issue was not whether Singapore had 
stringent crimin3l sanctions for rchuivcly minor acls. but 
rather the severity of the punishment for vandalism. One 
objection to the punishment was that 11 did 11011,1 the cnme-
a violmion of the rule of proportionality. Those who voiced 
this objection thought that the degree of punishment should 
correspond 10 the degree of ham, or damage thm was done 
by committing the illegal act, and that acts of vandalism did 
not warram a "physical beating." In defense of the sentence, 
government leaders of Singapore explained 1ha1 the legal 
system of 1hcir country owes more 10 those who abide by 
the laws (and so must provide them with ample protection) 
1lmn it does to those people who break the laws, whether or 
not they arc ci1i,.cns of Singapore. In other words, the heart 
of the mauer for Singapore's leaders was the maintenance 
of social order. The assumption was that such harsh penal-
ties would serve as a deterrent 10 those who might consider 
perpetrating such crimes in the future. And in so doing, the 
leadership of Singapore satisfied its obligation no110 act in 
ways rendering it unlikely that future generations in 
Singapore can have an equall y high standard of living. 
Critics of Singapore's 1rea1men1 ofFay, especially those 
from the Uniled S1a1es, cited their own society as a standard 
by which all others should be measured. For example, ii 
was said 1ha1 those who live in the United States live in a 
country thn.t takes seriously a broad notion of freedom and 
individual rights. which in some way tempers punishmems 
that would otherwise be considered cruel and unusual. For 
example. rather than caning the individual. police and pros-
ecutors in the United States often dispose or such offenses 
with n warning. probation, or restitution. The government 
of Singapore, however, has given more importance 10 the 
notion of "collective security" than lo individual freedoms 
J 
and rights. But the result is 1101 all bad. In some ways life in 
Singapore is more pleasant than life in some me1ropoli1:1n 
areas of the United States. 111c screets arc clean and J>Cdcs-
trians arc relacively safe and secure from violent assault. 
Not many Americans who live in urban centers such as New 
York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles can say the same about 
theirslreets and personal safety. Nevertheless. many Ameri-
cans would say that the cost of such security is 100 great; on 
the one hand, quick and severe punishment for those per-
sons who seek 10 breach the security of those around them 
and. on the other hand, a far more restricted view of free-
dom and rights.• 
But who is 10 say which approach carries with ii a 
greater degree or moral legitimacy? Is a nation whose gov-
ernment cxhibils a degree of authoritarianism in order lo 
protect those who live within ils territorial boundaries, 
though at a cost or certain freedoms and rights, morally su-
perior to a na1ion who~c government allows for a wider .and 
<lccrx:r dispersal of frccd<nns ,.an<l a more s1ringcn1 proh.:1,;-
1ion of incJividual right$, though m the cost or allowing for 
what seems 10 be a certain degree of "anarchy"? In the ab-
sence of caning being an egregious violation of hum:m ritht.s, 
which would be the impetus for widespread moral rejection 
of this form or punishmenc, the case of caning seems 10 be 
one of ethics as sovereign. It is precisely because caning is 
used 10 i nhibil the erosion of the social fabric, which is es-
sential for democracy and the development of human po-
tential, that the chOice of how people will determine the 
shape of their associmions should be left up to them. If free-
dom means living life lo the fullest such that a citizen has 
the ability to satisfy his or her material and intellectual needs 
and desires-in other words, 10 develop his or her poten-
tial, then perhaps freedom should be measured in cerms or 
not only nOn·intcrfercncc wi1h a person's rights but also in 
tenns of a person's security. Is a woman who has her prop-
cny vandalized. free? Is a man in consrnm fear of having 
his possessions Ucstroycd rrcc to Uc velor himself to the full• 
est of his potential? If government does not provide the con-
ditions lo allow citizens to act according 10 their rights, then 
citizens will not be able to pursue Lheir own values and ends, 
10 pursue their own vision of the good life. And if the devel-
opment of one's potential is determined in part by the socio-
political-cconomic conditions that the individual rinds him-
self or herself in, then perhaps the citizens ought lo decide 
for themselves whether can ing is a morally permissible fonn 
of punishment. 
Bodily Mutilation 
The second set or cases concerns hodily muti lmion. 
Taking the clearly acceptable case lirst, it seems that facial 
mutilation (e.g .. facial scarring and piercing) is n case in 
poin1. Although some people may not be inclined to per-
form gross mutila1ion on hi~ or her own fncc or on 1hc fncc 
of a family member, facial mu1ilatiun docs nol seem IO he 
morally objectionable if ii is undertaken voluncarily. This ,s 
true in many societies: people arc generally allowed (or free) 
10 treat their bodies as they please. Indeed, the facial scar-
,I 
ring that is c0tnmonly found in some TI1ird World countries 
is in some ways quite simi lar to the morally acceptable pro-
cedure of cosmetic surgery (whether it involves a "nose job" 
ror a 1ni<lc.Jlc· agc<l woman or the removal of a lail from a 
newbo111) that is routinely done in the developed world.• 
And, of course. there arc those less radical practices that are 
found morally permissible throughout the world, practices 
like piercing an car or nose with metal objects. 
On the other hand, the ancient pract ice of female cir-
cumcision, often referred 10 as female genital muti lation 
(FGM), is widely acknowledged as being morally wrong, 
p;,nicularly when it is done involuntarily and when ii sc• 
verdy compromises a woman's general health, capacity for 
reproduction, or sexual pleasure.' Although this pmctice has 
persisted for a variety of reasons, the i nvolumary and com-
promising features seem 10 be at work in three of the four 
basic fonns of female circumcision: .. sunna," excision, and 
1he most radical form of 1hc practice, infibulation, or 
"Pharonic" circumcision. Sunna circumcision involves the 
removal of the prepuce or clitoral hood while allowing the 
gland and body of the cl itoris 10 remain imnct. Excision. 
sometimes c.tllctl "cliwridcclOmy," is 1hc most common 
fonn of circumcision and oncn involves the removal of 1hc 
enti re clitoris. Allhough the extent 10 which Lhese forms of 
circumcision reduce 1he sexual pleasure of the woman is 
unclear. the immediate c1Tcc1s of these procedures to a 
woman's health arc quite apparcni.' They often include 
shock. hemorrhaging, and serious bacterial infections. In 
a<l<li1inn, 1hcrc o;1rc ortcn long-lcnn gynecological and gcnito,. 
urinary complications resulling from these procedures. in-
cluding infertility and diiTiculty in childbirth.• But of the 
three forms of circumcision noted above, it is the radical 
procedure of inribulation that has Lhc most deleterious ef-
fects on a woman's hcal~l. childbearing, and sexuality. This 
is because inlibulation involves the removal of almost all 
of the external female genitalia and what remains is sewn 
togc1hcr leaving a small hole for the pass~lge of urine and 
mcns,rual blood. Of course, the adverse effects can be se-
vere with any of these forms. but the problems arc most 
pronounced with infibulation. problems which range from 
hemorrhage and acute infection lo chronic infection and 
diiTicultics in childbinh.'0 
The growing acknowlcdgmcn11hat female genital mu-
tilation is morally reprehensible is reflected in a number or 
international legal documents 1ha1 have been adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly. One such document is 
1hc Universal Declaration of Human Rights that was adopted 
in 1948. It spells out 1hc fundamental human rights that 
member states have pledged 10 protect as well as promote. 
Among ~le articles tha1 pertain 10 female circumcision arc: 
Article 3, ··Everyone has the right lo li fe, liberty and the 
security of person": and Article 5. "No one shall be sub-
jected lo torture or 10 cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment."" Another powerful document is the 
Convc111ion on 1hc Elimination or All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CED AW), which was adopted by the 
General Assembly in 198 1. The CEDAW is a convention 
8/izek and Conces 
that was specifically drafted 10 acknowledge that women 
have an equal right 10 the fu ll enjoyment of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as do men. AILhough the con• 
vcntion docs not mcn1ion genital mutilation by name, it is a 
revolutionary document insofar as it acknowledges a link-
age between custom and the restriction of women's enjoy-
ment of their human rights. a linkage that encompasses fc. 
male genital mutilation. Under the convention's Article 5. 
for example, governments arc obliged to "'modify the social 
and cultural paucrns of conduct of men and women, with a 
view 10 achieving the e limination of prejudices and cus-
tomary and all other practice., which arc based on the idea 
or 1hc inferiority or the superiority of either of 1hc sexes or 
on the stereotyped roles for men and women."" But it was 
no1 until the United Nations World Conference on Human 
Rights held in Vienna in June 1993 that the member states 
took seriously the global dimensions of female-targeted vio-
lence. In the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
member states declared that ~icy should work towards "Ll1e 
elimination of violence against women in public and pri-
vate life, the elimination of all fonns of sexual harassment. 
exploitation and tmfficking in women. the elimination of 
gender bias in the adrninis1rntion of justice and the eradica· 
1ion or any conflicts which may arise between the rights of 
women and the harmful effects of certain traditional or cus-
tomary practices, cultural prejudices and religious cxtrcm· 
ism."" But by far the most important resolution adopted by 
the General Assembly was 1he 1993 Declaration on the 
Eli1ni11ation uf V iulcm.:cAgain.sL \Vomcn, Aniclc 2 of which 
defined violence ngainsl women as including "physical. 
sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, 
including bauering, sexual abuse of female children in the 
household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female 
genital 111111ilario11 [our italics) and other traditional prac-
tices harmful 10 women, non-spousal violence and violence 
related to exploitation."14 
But what about genital mu1i la1ion that has liulc heahh 
risk and that docs not hann a woman's capacity for repro-
duction or sexual pleasure? The least intrusive fom1 of fe-
male circumcision called ritualist ic circumcision, a procc~ 
dure that involves the clitoris· merely being ··nicked" by a 
sharp instrument. is such a practice. Although it is a surgi-
cal procedure. il is no more in1rusivc, painful, and sexually 
debilitating than male circumcision. a surgical procedure 
that involves the removal of the foreskin of the penis and 
which. like the female procedure, can be followed by the 
onset of infection. TI1c simi larities between male circumci-
sion and ritualistic circumcision become clearer once we 
realize that (I) male and female circumcision arc partly 
rooted in religious ritual, the forrncrrepresenting a covenant 
between God and His people in Judaism. whereas the laucr 
is associated with the important virtue of chastity wi~iin 
the Muslim religion; and (2) 1ha1 male and female circum-
cision often occurs 10 infants and young children. persons 
who arc unable 10 give their consent lo the procedure." If 
the analogy between the 1wo types of circumcision is mor• 
ally relevant. then perhaps there is a dilemma of moral con-
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sistency that critics must acknowledge: either the moral 
outrage that many show towards female circumcision should 
be directed solely at lhe three most in1rusive fonns or lhe 
proetice or their moral outrage towards ritualistic circumci-
sion should be extended 10 male circumcision. For what-
ever reason. however, the analogy is not given much ere• 
dence. thereby resulting in 1he dismissal or the dilemma. 
Yet the growing condemnation or female circumcision has 
not been confined 10 international organizations like the 
United Nations, for several governments have also prohib-
ited some. ir not all, forms of female circumcision within 
their own territorial boundaries. In 1982. Sweden passed a 
law making all forn1s or female circumcision illegal. ll is 
likewise illegal in England and Somalia. And in the United 
States. Congress appears 10 be confronting this practice by 
pulling together legislation (HR 3247) that would make ii 
illegal to perform female genital mutilation on a child in the 
United States as well as informing all new immigrants that 
the practice of fem.tic genital muti lation cannot he brought 
into this cc.,untry. Mori.!ovcr, 1hc highest immigration court 
in the United States. the Board of Immigration Appeals, re-
cently recognized the practice or female genital mu1i la1ion' 
as a forrn of persecution and ruled that a 19-year-old West 
African woman be granted political asylum. 
Bui the question remains, at what point should ti pr.tc-
lice like female circumcision be deemed "'dangerous" 
enough 10 be an egregious violation of human rights, a vio-
lation that requires intervention on the part of international 
organizations and governments? This issue is especially 
pertinent given that all forms of circumcision for the two 
genders have not been shown lO be surlicicntly dissimilar 
in the way that they would have 10 be in order for us 10 
render different moral and legal judgements, thereby e lud-
ing chnrgcs of selectivity, inconsistency, and even capricious-
ness. TI1ere must be important moral considerations in re-
gard 10 the practice of female genital mu1i lation 10 out weigh 
the moral reasons for respecting a nation's sovereignty and 
to single out this mutilation as a practice 10 be banned world-
wide. Even a '"condition of reasonableness." such that there 
is some plausible basis for believing that a prohibition against 
this practice will promote 10 some measure the well-being 
of people worldwide, is not sutncicnt i r the prohibition is 
self-serving for its sponsors.'"This would be renected in a 
situation in which the countries of the North and West arc 
pcrmiucd to continue male circumcision. while those of the 
South and East are subject to stringent regulations prohibit-
ing the female forms. 
Population Control 
The third set of cases concerns populalion contrc ,I. On 
the one hand, population control is clearly acccp1able in situ-
ations where it is undertaken voluntarily. Ways of l imiting 
1he fertility rate include hormonal me1hods, such as the birth 
control pill and Norplant®: harrier mcthrnJ:,., su«.:h ;.ts <lia-
phrngms. condoms. :tnd spermicides: IUDs: stcrilii:uion; 
abstinence; surgical abonion: and chemical abortion. such 
as RU 486. or course. the means by which a womnn li mits 
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the number of limes she gives birth during her lifetime is 
subject 10 vigomus de bale. For example, there is a debate 
among Catholics concerning the Church's prohibition of con-
traception and abortion as mora11y illegitimate in their own 
right, regardless of how voluntari ly they may be used by a 
woman. But, in principle, the idea of women being allowed 
to make procreative decisions seems to be widely rccog· 
nized 1hroughou1 the world. T he recent debate concerning 
reproductive and sexual rights, especially the debate Ul the 
United Nations Fourth World Conference on Women held 
in Beijing in 1995. has brought much auent ion to this issue. 
Al the core of this debate is the right lo de1erminc the size 
and spacing of one's family. which is bound up with the 
ideas of bodily integrity and sexual sclr-dcterrnination. Any 
a11emp1 by a woman to voluntarily delay starling a fami ly 
or 10 curb the s ize of her famil y seems 10 be rcnective of 
these fundamental idcas.17 
On the 01her hand, population control is clearly wrong 
when it prohibits competent individuals, i.e., those who have 
the physical nnd psychological capacities as well tL< the li-
nancial resources to raise a child. from bearing children in 
nations in which doing so would not have an adverse effect 
on 1hc econom ic development or the socio-political stltbil-
ily or lite nation-stale. Questions of competency covering 
such a rnnge or capacities seem to be relevant considerations 
as regards whe1her someone ought to be allowed 10 have 
children as well as the number of children 10 be had. In-
deed. lhe quality or life should be more than that experi-
enced by a perrcctly misernhlc person. Bul to prohibit those 
women who arc adequately endowed in such a selling from 
bearing children would be 10 act contrary 10 not only the 
Beijing Declaration. but also Article 16 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights which stales that ··Men and 
women of full age ... have the right to marry and to found 
a fomily."11 
But do we have good rea~on 10 say that it is morally 
wrong for a govcrmr1cn1 or a developing nntion to coerce its 
female citizens 10 not hove more than one child? Or, for thnt 
mauer, is it morally wrong for such a government tococrcc 
its remalc citizens 10 have children? Is there wide ngrec-
rnent that coercion in either situation is morally wrong or 
are lhc moral objections just symptomatic of cultural domi-
nation? We believe there is a split decision; antinatalist popu-
lation policies (of, for example. present-day China) rnay be 
morally permissible given certain conditions. whcrea.'i ::i 
strong case can be ,nndc that pronatalist policies (of, for 
example, Romania underCeau~cscu) arc morally impermis-
sible. 
Take China's current one-child policy. which has hccn 
one or the most controversial policies in the world . The 
Chinese government became increasingly aware or its popu· 
lation problem 1hroughou1 the 1970s, corning 101he reali,.,. 
tion that even if its feni li ly rote were 10 drop 10 the ··re-
placement level" of ahout two children per woman, its pop1.1• 
lution wou ld continue to grow for ill least 50 yc.:.irs bc(.;~1Usc 
of "demographic momcmum·· (that is, each woman is h:tv· 
ing fewer chi ldren, but the number of women who arc giv-
r, 
ing birth is much greater)." It was this rc.11iz,uion that led LO 
the current one-child policy. At the core of the policy is a 
set or benefits or incentives and punishments. For those 
couples that pledge Lo have no more than one child (called 
"one-child certified" families). a wide range of benefits are 
made available. including allowances for medic.al care and 
housing, priority for schOQling and employment. and dis-
counts for rood. But for those who exceed the allowable 
number of children, there arc a set or severe lines and sanc-
tions. Allhough the policy is enforced diITcrcntly in the ur-
ban centers than it is in the rural areas. it allows for a variety 
or punishments ranging from restricting living accommo-
d~Hions lo limiting employment opportunities. There arc even 
allegations thnt the oflicial J>Olicy includes coerced abor-
tions and stcrili z.ations.20 The latter allegations have espe-
cially led many individuals as well as governments to mor-
ally object to China's popul ation control pol ic ies. But 
whereas those who object to China's policies emphasize the 
individuality and personal autonomy or human rights. the 
Chinese leadership has focused on the collective and social 
unity as the key considerations allowing them to ensure 
socio-economic development. In lhis sense no c>nc shc>uld 
be allowed 10 impose a cost on others simply by having a 
child. especially when doing so has a negative impact on 
the distribution of goods and $Crviccs in a community. Some 
interference in the personal and private part of peoples' lives 
may be required if a community is to control its population 
and to regulate the quality or life of its people. 
These 1wo goals arc cxlremcly important for Chini1 
because Lhcy arc inLcrt wined. Or course, in Lhc broader .scope 
or things. the control or the world's p<)pulntion is an ex-
tremely imponanl goal. According to the United Nations 
Population Division, the world's population is now approxi-
mately 5.77 billion and is growing at an annual rmcor 1.48%. 
11,is means that the world's population will increase by 81 
million next year and that the global population will double 
in 43 ycars.11 1llcsc startling ligurcs. however. Uo not ne-
cessitate n doomsday scenario for mankind. 11lis is because 
,nuch c.an happen in the next four dcc:.ldcs. no1 10 mention 
the fact that the variety or assumptions. choices. and un-
known variables that surround the numerous estimates or 
the human carrying capacity of the planet arc not well un-
derstood. ·1nis is made clear when we rcali1.c that these es-
timates range from I billion (a ligurc that mankind surpassed 
quite some time ago) Lo I trillion.ll But given thnt more 
than hair of these estimates fall within the range of 4 bi llion 
and 16 billion, the issue or world population growth should 
be wkcn as a serious concern. And it is not j ust a maucr of 
sheer numbers or people, for as nco-Malthusians and others 
have indicated, a continued increase in world population is 
linked 10 the rctardntion or dcvclopmcm and economic 
growlh. the degradation of lhc environn1cn1. the cxaccrba· 
tion of poveny, and a rise in social breakdown and armed 
conmc1Y 
Allhough these linkages may be played out differently 
from counlry to country. the linkage of a 1argc population 
that continues to grow and environmental dcgradt1lion is 
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most certainly demonstrated in China.'' China. the most 
p0pulatcd country in the world. has a population or 1.23 
billion persons and a population growth rate of 1.4%. Chino's 
rapid population growth and the growth and distribution or 
China's poor have resulted in numerous environmental prob-
lems 1hat cover land, air, and water resources. Jn terms or 
China's land resources. the increase in population has re-
sulted in a tremendous demand for timber and firewood. 
thereby funhcr resulting in increasing pressures on its for• 
est resources. TI1ese same forest ecosystems arc also in dan-
ger from land conversion because of the increasing need to 
turn forests into crop producing acreage. But it is not only 
the forest ecosystems that arc being destroyed or degraded, 
for China's large p0pula1ion has been a principal cause for 
grassland degradation as well as the degradation or amble 
land due to poor land-use policies. 
China is also paying a heavy price for having such a 
large population in terms of air pollution due to the demand 
fnr ever increasing amounts or energy. China already is the 
world's leading producer and consumer or coal. Coal sup-
plies three-quarters of China's energy and is the biggest 
source or low atmospheric air pollution in cities as well a11 
the principal source or sulfur dioxide that causes acid rain. 
Some researchers have noted that air pollution has gotten 
so bad in Chinn that current levels mirror lcvclsofairpollu· 
tion or the developed countries during the 1950s.» 
And in tcrrns of iLs water resources. China is facing 
serious problems of water pollution caused primarily by the 
drainage of industrial waste wntcr. The pollutants or 1h1s 
runoff not only affect surface water, but groundwater as well, 
which has conlributcd to frequent fresh water shortages in 
China's urban centers. 
It is in part a response to these and otherenvironmentnl 
problems that plague China thal its leadership has soughtto 
curb the damage that is being done to the environment in 
the interest of the common good (i.e .. lhc quality oflire 1ha1 
is suitable Lo its people). Consequently. China has sought 
"public intervention" 10 control "pri vate action." or course. 
population policies which include coercive sterilization and 
abortion arc morally objectionable insofar as they involve 
"cruel. inhuman, or degrading treatment." But a coercive 
practice need not be morally improper. ll is when a policy is 
a violation or Article 5 of the UN Universal Declaration or 
Human Rights that we can persuasively claim ~mt the policy 
is immoral.26 But docs a coercive policy that uses positive 
incentives as well as the withholding or privileges be con-
strued as a violation of Article 5? And what about Anicle 6 
which concerns the founding or a family. Are such mea-
sures violations or this article? Once again, in the absence 
or measures that arc egregious violations of human rights. 
the case o f population comrol seems 10 be one or ethics or 
sovereignty. 
IV 
What arc the obvious lessons to be learned from this 
exercise? First, practices thal are widely held to be morally 
acceptable should be acknowledged as such and even pro-
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molcd when appropriale. Second, lhosc praclices lhat arc 
widely rejeclcd as mor.illy unacceptable should be erndi· 
cated. But are al l practices easily pigeonholed as heing ei-
1hcr morally acceptable or unacccplable? Our s1udy sug· 
gcs1s tha11his is n01 1he case. Indeed, caning, ri1uulis1ic cir· 
cumcision. and China's one-child policy seem 10 be such 
prac1iccs. But unlike prac1iccs 1hm arc clearly acccp1able or 
unacccp1nblc. in which case s1cps lo promo1c or eradicate 
them can be implcmcnlcd by governments or intcrnaLional 
organi ,,a1ions. 1hcsc practices may p0sc a di lemma 10 1hose 
who fom1ula1c and implcmenl policies 1ha1 affecl how people 
live their lives. On first glance. some may argue 1ha1 ~uch 
prac1ices should be lcCI alone, :u lcas1 ror 1hc present time. 
because 10 do 01hcrwisc may suggest an ancmpt on the part 
or some na1ions 10 force 01hcr nu1ions 10 conform 10 pur-
1iculare1hical standards. thereby rekindli ng the colonialism 
of yesteryear. Bul 1his leaves us wi1hou1 even 1hc barcsl of 
cri1eria 10 decide for ourselves the range of momlly acccpl· 
able measures 1hm our leaders (as well as leaders of regional 
and international organizations) can tilkc with regards to 
these "normmively fuzzy" prac1iecs. Can this be remedied 
in some way'! \Ve think so. even if only in the mosl simp1c~t 
of terms. 
So what is lhe Clinlon adminis1rmion. for example. al-
lowed 10 do concerning the 1hrcc cases al hand? Whal arc 
the oplions open lo lhc administrali on? To begin wi1h. per-
haps ii would be bc.sl lo consider whal kind of prncliccs we 
arc dealing wilh. for this will in large measure help to dc1cr-
minc what ~hould or shou1d no1 he done. One way 10 cal-
egorizc such practices is to place them into one of two c.1t-
cgorics: s1a1c-dircc1cd prac1ices and culture-based pmc1iccs. 
Those 1ha1 arc s1a1c-dircc1cd arc practices 1ha1 arc the direct 
resuh of a govcrnmcnl's laws and/or policies. T hey arc prac-
tices 1ha1 would cease 10 be within a rcla1ivcly shon period 
of1ime if1hc government responsible ror thcm lOok slcps 10 
change the rclcvanl laws and/or policies. Ahhough srntc 
sponsored terrorism is nn act that is or the "obviousl)' inl· 
moral category." measures laken by 1hc govcrnmenl of Iran 
to cunail terrorism, such as withholding Jogis1ical :mcl fi. 
nancial support from lhe pro-Iranian Hizbullah in Lebanon. 
would be an example of such a policy change. On lhc 01hcr 
hand, cul1urc-bascd prac1iccs are nol slale-direclcd. lhough 
they may be sta1c-sanc1ioned (i.e .. 1hc prac1iccs arc neither 
promolcd nor discouraged by the govcrnmcn1). T hey arc 
prac1iccs 1ha1. over 1i mc. have become a way of life forcer-
tain scgmenls of lhe popula1ion. 
lnlo which of lhcsc calegorics do we place caning. rilu· 
alislic circumcision, and China's one-child policy? Caning 
and China's one-child policy arc c lear cases of s1a1c-dircc1cd 
prac1iccs. The former is a punishmcn11ha1 is a pan of lhe 
cri minal code of Singapore, whereas 1hc laner is an official 
s1a1c policy of China. Surely. bolh of1hcsc prac1ices would 
cease lo be iflhc govcrnmcnls of Singapore and China took 
slcps to rcwri1c i1s criminal code or i1s populaiion policy 
rcspcc1ivcly. On lhc other hand. ri1ualis1ic c ircumcision 
seems 10 be a cuhurc-bascd pmc1icc 1ha1 is lolcrnlcd by many 
governments around lhc world. 
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We can now con~idcr the options opc.n to ;1 Uisgrumlc<l 
U.S. adminis1ra1ion lhal feels 1hc need todo somethi ng :ihout 
these sorts of prac1ices. Given that mnny of these prnc1iccs 
arc though1 lo be morally wrong because or their rch11iu11-
ship to fundamental human rights. il seems clear that the 
sort of state intervention llmt is being .tlludcd lo is none 
other than "humanitarian intervention.'' Although 1hc clas-
sic definition of humanitarian intervention as "forcihlc self. 
help by s1a1cs 10 pro1cc1 humnn rights" is still rcg;irdcd hy 
many commentators as the preferred usage. there has hccn 
a growing efforl on lhe part of olhers 10 expand lhis dcrini· 
1ion 10 include forcihle self-help hy regional :111d in1crna-
1ional organi1..a1 iuns (and. perhaps. hy corpor:11 ions like Ex-
ecutive Outcomes). the 1hrcat or use of non-mili tary coer-
cion (e.g .. economic boycotts) . .is well as non-coercive 
measures (e.g., secret rinancial suppor1 of friendly polili-
cians).11 Of1hcse. perhaps it is coercive (mili l:try and non-
military) humanitarian intervention that is 1hc mosl co111ro-
vcrsial . .since it is thi:-. sort of intervention that is must citctl 
a.s involving the violation of a nation 's sovcrcignty.1K Which 
of 1hc prac1iccs cited above would be t>cs1 deali with by 
mc.1n~offorciblc rniliiary hun1;mirnrinn intcrvc111ion"! Since 
this sort of intervention is the most intrusive and tlcs1ruc-
1ive of the fom1s ofimervention. the source of the inhuman-
ity lhat ism work in a country should be understood as some-
thing which is weJl.{lcflncd, singular in n:11urc. :uul set :1pan 
rrom the victims. A despotic ruler would t,c a clear-cul ex-
ample or such a source or inhumanily. or lhc three prac-
tices that have hccn ex:uninc<I, <mly !-;ing:,porc·._ punishmcnl 
by caning and China's one-chilcl policy arc ohvious cases 
of st:lle-dircclcd pract ices 1ha1 could be brought to an end 
through overt or covert ,nilitary operations.:,.; Bui 1hc proh• 
1cm is that na1ional sovereignty and terri torial integrity 
should be respected and 1ho11heir violation should only OC· 
cur in lhe most extreme of circumst:mccs.X• \Vhat sor1s of 
conditions might we wanl to consider :t" having to he s:uis-
licd before such in1crvcn1ion is thought lube morally jusli• 
ficd'! T he just-warist perspective on the moral jus1ifica1ion 
of going to w:ir-theju:r tul be/lum-rrovitlcs us with three 
imporlan1 condit ions: ( I) 1he principle of just cause: (2) 1hc 
pri nciple of proportionalily: and (3) lhe principle of las1 rc-
sort.31 Perhaps the only j ust cause 10 warrant the use of mi li-
tary force in the protection of human rights would be if there 
were egregious or gross human rights violations being com· 
rniucd by a government. A It hough lhcrc is no clear ;.1grec· 
rnent with regard 10 the mcnning of 1hc term 'gross human 
rights violations' as well as the sorts of acts considered 1n 
be such violalions, lhe Uni1cd Nmions considers 1he fol-
lowing 10 be examples of gross human rights violations: 
··genocide: slavery und slavery .. likc prac1ices: summary or 
:irbilrary executions; 1or1urc and cruel. inhuman or degrad-
ing 1rentmcnt or punishment; enforced disappcar~1ncc: arbi· 
trary and prolonged dc1cntion; dcpona1ion or forcible lrans-
rcr of populalion; and sys1cma1ic discriminalion. in particu-
lar based on race or gender."" Arc Singapore and China 
guilly of such violations when ii comes to caning ;.tnd 1he 
one-chi ld policy rc.<pcctivcly"! Perhaps, hul il doc.< nul scc111 
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10 be obvious 10 us. A strong argument would have to be 
prcscn1ed for 1his condi1ion 10 be mcl. Bui even if 1his con-
diiion is said 10 be sa1isfied, 1hc olher 1wo condi1ions appear 
10 be obslaclcs for the immediaie use of force. TI1e principle 
of proportionali1y may nol be mel because the amoun1 of 
harm 10 persons as well as destruction of property ( i.e .. the 
amoun1 of evil) for al l involved may 1101 ou1weigh 1he good 
that is achieved by lhe use of mi litary force in protccling 
human riglus. Moreover, 1hc principle of las1 resort requires 
that all avenues 10 rec1ify 1he injuslice must be exhausied 
prior 10 overt or covert miliiary aclion. It is unlikely that 
1hcse avenues have been exhausted with regard to either prac-
tice. So it appears 1ha1 the use of forcible miliiary humani-
tarian in1crven1ion does nol seem to be jusiified for use 
against Singapore and China. 
What ubout coercive non•militr1ry humanitarian inter .. 
vcniion'! Is it morally permissible for 1he C li nton adminis-
1ra1ion 10 use such intervention 10 influence the leadership 
of Sing:1porc to change its criminal code or IO persuade the 
Chinese govl.!rnmcnt to rcfonnulatc its popul:ition comrol 
policy'! In regards 10 Singapore's criminal code, an effort 10 
induce a revision of the code could be made by linkingjudi-
cial reform with n con1inuancc of good political. economic, 
cuhural, and scientilic lies with the Uni led Srnles. Measures 
such as culluml and economic boycons. as well as wi1h-
holding ccnain kinds of aid, freezing asseis. and imposing 
various other economic and p0Jitical sanctions could be con· 
sidcrcd by the administration. Of course. there is no prima 
facic obligation for lhc U .S. to provide assistnncc to 
Singapore. bu1 for 1he governmenl of 1he Uniied S1a1cs 10 
link i1s graniing of foreign assis1ance to Singapore on 1he 
basis o f wheihcr 1ha1 country shares a particular 
:uJministrntion's views on rrccdom, individual rights, pun· 
ishmcnl, and social order 1m1y be taken as just another in-
stance of coercive interference in the internal affairs of a 
sovereign nation, an interference that m:1y have liulc. if any· 
1hing, to do with self-defense or 1hc prevention of gross vio-
lations of human rights, two recognized exceptions 10 the 
general prohibition of assaulting a nation's sovereignty. 
Many of 1hc same measures could be taken agains1 
China nnd i1s one-child policy. but one measure 1ha1 has been 
used ngninst China nnd 01her couniries 1ha1 h,1ve ndoplcd 
"coercive" popula1ioncon1rol policies is the rcduc1ion/climi-
na1ion of fomily planning assisiance. Forexam1>lc. uni ii 1he 
19ROs lhe Uni1cd S1a1cs hnd a long his1ory of established 
policies of giving family plnnning nssistancc 10 developing 
coun1rics.JJ \Vith the firs1 1enn of the Reagan administra-
1ion. however, U.S. policy changed dramaiically. TI,e Rc-
puhlican nc.lministraiion reversed U.S. policy and decided 
It• cliiuin:111.: it!- funding or inrcrnotimwl family planning 
progr.uns, which inclutlcd funding th;H wus connccccd '"' ilh 
ahonions. ·nic adminis1r~1ion firs! reduced U.S. con1ribu-
1ions. 1hen 1oially climinalcd iis funds 10 1hc ln1crna1ional 
l'lannc<I l'arc111l11~>d l'cdcr:uiun (IPl'F) and 1he U11i1cd Nn-
1i11ns Popula1ion Fund (UNFPA). Aclion was 1aken agains1 
1hc ll'PF because ii provided funds ror abor1ions, where:is 
1hc dcfunding of 1hc UNFPA 100k pince because ii provided 
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suppor1 10 China's "coercive" family planning program. 
Although runding for family planning continued through 
bilaieral programs under the auspices of the Uni1ed Srnies 
Agency for ln1erna1ional Developmcn1 (USAID), the con-
lributions were for selccled programs and 1he conlributions 
were m diminished levels. 
Although some had hoped 1ha1 a change in adminis1ra-
1ions would bring a change in U.S. policy 1oward family 
planning nssisiance, the arrival of 1he Bush adminis1ra1ion 
only resuhed in 1hc continuation of 1he policies put fonh by 
1he Reagan adminislralion. Presidcn1 Bush even wen! so far 
as to veto several bills !hat were proposed by Congress 10 
resiore funding for family planning programs. In 1995 lhc 
Clin1on adminislration publicly announced i1s willingness 
10 reassert U.S. leadership in !his area by sening aside a 
record $547 million for family planning programs, but lime 
will !ell whether the cffecis of the Reagan and Bush poli-
cies wi ll be reversed, thereby resulling in renewed efforls 
lo further reduce glohnl popula1ion grow1h." In 1hc mcan-
1imc, 1hc qucs1ion should be asked, "Were 1hc poliiics of 1hc 
past two Republican administrations a case of conservative 
American polilics and morali1y dictaling how China and 
01her developing coun1rics should go about anempting 10 
conirol thc size of !heir populations by interfering in indi-
viduals' choices about !heir reprocluc1i vc behavior?" 
Bui whai abou1 the various forms of female gcni1al cir• 
cumcision? Given 1ha1 the prac1ice is a culturally-based one. 
the use of forcible military humanirnrian in1erven1ion docs 
nol seem 10 be morally jus1ifiable. In 1his case, !he source of 
1he evil is no1 well-defined, singular in naiure, and exiernal 
to the vic1ims. Ralher, ii is pan of a lo11g sumdi11g cultural 
tradilion. As for coercive non-mili1ary humanitarian inier-
veniion, therc are measures like econom ic and cultural boy-
cous and the wi1hholding of certain kinds of aid. Sanc1ions 
like 1hese, however, have limi1ed leverage. since 1he coun-
1ries in which 1he practice of female genilal mu1ila1ion is 
most prevalent nrc countries of the Third World, countries 
which arc in dire need of assisiance from countries like 1he 
United S1a1cs and Canada. Sanctions 1ha1 arc 1hough1 1ocnd 
1he plight of women may in fac1 decrease the level of well-
being of 1hosc already marginalized in the 1arge1ed coun1ry. 
Perhaps lhc best approach 10 changing the cultural prac-
tices of a nation is by educating i1s citizens to refrain from 
ccnnin prac1ices. But whaiever approach is adoplcd, 1arge1ed 
groups may Slill view the "requcs1" for change 10 fail 1he 
1cs1 of impnr1inli1y, whereby cultures arc 001 tre:ucd as hav-
ing equal worlh and value. 
In an age of ever increasing con1ac1s among peoples 
who possess very different views on politics, economics. 
religion. 11nd mornli1y. lhcrc will he :, growing desire hy 
leaders of powerful naiiuns 10 judge ei1her 01hcr peoples' 
beliefs and values according lo their own srnndards. or 10 
make some son of anempl al being "fair" to all peoples all 
the time. Yet we have t:,kcn issue with the tendency tow:trd:-: 
moral universalism and cenirisin as well as 1he procli vity 
1ownrds particularisms and polyccnlrism. Nci1her approach 
in and ofilselfis sa1isfac1ory; !here is no moral algorithm of 
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any kind. It is against this backdrop that a different approach 
unfolds: an approach according to which each prnc1icc must 
be examined in its own right 10 determine if un ethics of 
sovereignty or an ethics or superiori ty can be appropriately 
applied 10 it. We hope that our examination of this issue has 
made ii clear how real a problem this is for those who arc 
moving into the next millennium. 
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